CA☆ FORUM ON THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY

Four-Field Anthropology
Charter Myths and Time Warps from St. Louis to Oxford

by Dan Hicks

The four-field model of anthropology is conventionally understood to have begun with a paper read by Franz Boas in St. Louis in 1904. Publishing for the first time a drawing made by Augustus Pitt-Rivers in England in 1882, this paper rethinks this proposition by making two arguments. First, the paper explores the role of the classificatory anthropology of the 1870s and 1880s on both sides of the Atlantic in the emergence of the idea of organizing anthropological knowledge. It suggests that this emergence was bound up with the problem of classifying anthropological knowledge in material form in European and North American museums. Second, the paper considers how our knowledge of the discipline’s past can develop from the study of objects and documents (rather than only through rereading anthropologists’ published texts), in a manner akin to documentary archaeology. In this respect, the anthropological problem of organizing knowledge in material form is still with us, but with a new challenge: How adequate are our current forms of disciplinary historiography for the use of material evidence? Rather than proposing a new set of “charter myths,” the paper explores writing the history of four-field anthropology as a form of material culture studies or historical archaeology (in other words, as a subfield of anthropology), working with the “time warps” created by museums and archives in which disciplinary history is not always already written.

In April 1962, Dell Hymes attended a conference on the history of anthropology held in the chambers of the Social Science Research Council in New York City. Back at Berkeley, Hymes reported on this experience with a degree of discomfort, reflecting, “Who shall write the history of anthropology? Shall we turn the subject wholly over to historians of science and scholarship? Or shall anthropologists continue to take part?” (1962:82). Half a century on, much more of the history of anthropology has been written, and often by anthropologists—but rarely employing an explicitly anthropological approach. The potential for using material things—museum and archival collections including letters, drawings, photographs, and even artifacts—has begun to be explored.1 But do anthropologists writing the history of anthropology bring nothing more than local knowledge to the history of science? Or can writing history with material culture as anthropologists provide a distinctive approach to the study of our disciplinary past?2

This kind of question is familiar to historical archaeologists, some of whom have long suggested that their use of material evidence might bring not just new data for “historical supplementation” to be incorporated into existing understandings of the recent past, but distinctive, anthropological forms of historiography (Hicks and Beaudry 2006). It is a much less familiar question in the history of anthropology. Indeed, if one major challenge has faced the historiography of the discipline, it has related not to material evidence but to indigenous knowledge, so to speak: the contingencies of writing the history of a body of thought that constantly defined and redefined itself in terms of its disciplinary past and future.

1. Notably, through a series of research projects based at the Pitt Rivers Museum at Oxford University. Since 2004, these projects have included “The Relational Museum,” “The Other Within: An Anthropology of Englishness,” “Re-thinking Pitt-Rivers,” “Scoping Museum Anthropology,” “World Archaeology at the Pitt Rivers Museum,” and “Excavating Pitt-Rivers,” all of which have extensive websites that can be explored through the Pitt Rivers Museum website at http://www.prm.ox.ac.uk/research_home.html.

2. This paper was written as part of the “Excavating Pitt-Rivers” project (2012–2013), funded by Arts Council England through the Designation Development Fund. Further details are on the project blog: http://excavatingpitrivers.blogspot.com.

© 2013 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights reserved. 0011-3204/2013/5406-0005$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/673385
From around the turn of the twentieth century, anthropological thought developed with a kind of reflexivity; hand in hand with a continual awareness of the anthropologist’s own position in relation to disciplinary history and punctuated by repeated efforts to co-opt a place in the discipline’s future. During this anthropological self-fashioning, periodic concerns about timelessness in ethnographic accounts proliferated, then blurred into conceptions of disciplinary history. Thus, Franz Boas’s critique of “The Limitations of the Comparative Method of Anthropology”—read at the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science at Buffalo in 1896, underlining the significance of historical connections in understanding anthropological cultures (Boas 1896:905)—was followed eight years later, in St. Louis in 1904, by a similar set of programmatic reflections on the future of anthropology that were titled “The History of Anthropology” itself (Boas 1904). Durkheim’s (1915) idea of the social construction of sacred time came over the subsequent generation to inform the emergent awareness of anthropologists’ own conjuring of the “ethnographic present” during anthropology’s own sacred rite of passage: fieldwork (Coon 1940:512). Evans-Pritchard’s account of “Nuer time reckoning” gave way a decade later to his definition, in his Marett lecture of 1950, of social anthropology as “a special kind of historiography” rather than “a special kind of natural science” (Evans-Pritchard 1939, 1950:123). Maybe the height of this tendency was Alfred Gell’s (1992) exploration of the history of anthropological theory through the idea of The Anthropology of Time.

Since modern anthropological thinking made so much creative use of disciplinary histories and futures, the historian of anthropology is never quite engaged in the “history of science” (Hymes 1962:82) but also never quite in the “science of history” (Harris 1968:1). As social historians of science routinely describe sequential worlds of “disciplinary matrices” (Kuhn 1970:182), so anthropologists might naturally work from native categories: how functionalism defined itself as distinct from classification and the comparative method (Boas 1896), structural-functionalism from functionalism (Radcliffe-Brown 1940), structuralism from structural-functionalism (Leach 1973), and the many new adjectival forms of anthropology that emerged after the 1970s from each other. We could imagine writing the discipline’s history as just a sequence of new, future-oriented rejections of “achronic” accounts of nonwestern life (Ardener 1971:210): historicist rejections of the comparative method (Kroeber 1935:540), of functionalism (Pocock 1961:102), of structuralism (Fabian 1983), and of the “zero-time fictions” of the postcolonial world (Vansina 1970:165; Wolf 1982). As Edwin Ardener once put it, the temporality that was built into twentieth-century anthropological theory represented a form of modernism: it “declared new ages, created new forms,” knowing “that there are historical movements” and undertaking “to label new ones in advance, as it were” (Ardener 1987:192).

But these future-oriented anthropologies also continually redrew their past, through intellectual descent groups. Evans-Pritchard (1950:119, 123) claimed the Scottish Enlightenment as the birthplace for the discipline. Marvin Harris’s account of The Rise of Anthropological Theory sketched a pedigree for cultural materialism that began with John Locke (Harris 1968:10–12). Bronislaw Malinowski’s (1944:4, 15) discussion of “concepts and methods of anthropology” listed Bougainville and Oliver Goldsmith as predecessors of such “pioneering students in comparative human cultures” as Bastian, Tylor, Pitt-Rivers, Ratzel, and Durkheim. Robert Lowie’s History of Ethnological Theory suggested that “the real revolution came with . . . Boucher de Perthes” (Lowie 1937:7), while Alfred Cort Haddon’s (1910:x) cosmopolitan ancestry for the History of Anthropology began with “the Greek philosopher, Aristotle; the Belgian anatomist, Vesalius; the Englishmen, Tyson and Pritchard; the Swede, Linnaeus; the Frenchman, Buffon; and the German, Blumenbach.” Thus, for the twentieth-century anthropologist, disciplinary histories functioned like Malinowski’s account of ‘mythical charters,’ which evoked the Trobriand past as “one vast storehouse of events” where “the line of demarcation between myth and history does not coincide with any division into definite periods of time” (Malinowski 1922:300–301). Sometimes they came closer to what Radcliffe-Brown (1941:1) called purely “theoretical or conjectural history,” concerned more often with succession than with descent.

In all these ways and more, twentieth-century anthropology repeatedly conflated thinking about the anthropology of time with thinking about the history of anthropology. Efforts to avoid writing in the ethnographic present were simultaneously concerned with avoiding disciplinary stasis. Here, the gradual intellectual desertion of those places built to make time stand still (anthropological museums) was perhaps significant. If so, there are some significant implications for the disciplinary historian today. The contingent nature of anthropological history means that the historical sequence of successive, changing ideas is ready-made. In contrast, museums, as temporal interventions created by curatorial freeze-framing, bring about not historical successions but seemingly impossible juxtapositions across time and space. In the late nineteenth century, this made the comparative and classificatory approaches to material culture possible, but it is an effect that anthropological museums have not lost and that today encompasses the material remains of anthropology itself.

The Kuhnian historiography of science described not just successive “paradigm shifts” but also the simultaneous abandonment of “out-of-date beliefs,” transformed into myths (Kuhn 1970:3). However, as archaeologist David Clarke (1972:8) once put it, any account of paradigms lost must accommodate how “paradigms are rarely lost altogether; instead they die very slowly as their substance is reincorporated in fresh patterns of research.” Similarly, Edwin Ardener’s (1987) “intellectual archaeology of the moderne” (205) accommodated the question of taphonomy: the processes by which, as declarations of newness fade, ideas continue to “crystallize in persons and places,” “become embodied or located,” and so
come to persist as "time warps" (194). Anthropological museums are filled with the "slow deaths" of disciplinary thinking described by David Clarke and with the resulting time warps evoked by Edwin Ardener. They hold ideas in the form of objects and documents. They are places where disciplinary time is artificially stopped and where the history of anthropology is not always already written. For these reasons they represent potential field sites for writing disciplinary history.

The rest of this paper explores the implications of this idea. It focuses on a drawing and letter written by a nineteenth-century anthropologist: General Augustus Pitt-Rivers, whose collection formed the basis of the Pitt Rivers Museum, founded in 1884 at the University of Oxford (see the appendix, available online, for a transcription of the letter). Using these two documents, the paper excavates the most prominent of anthropology’s charter myths: the development in the United States of the “four-field” model of anthropology, which integrated physical anthropology, sociocultural anthropology, linguistic anthropology, and archaeology (Borofsky 2002:468). This "sacred bundle" (Cohn 1980:202) has been at the heart of recent debates about the structure, scope, and coherence of anthropology, both in learned societies like the American Anthropological Association and in the organization of teaching and university anthropology departments (Bruner 2010; Moses 1997; Stocking 1988). The paper traces a strange, transatlantic stratigraphy of charter myths and time warps, through which the four-field model has emerged, running from St. Louis, Missouri, to Oxford, England.

St. Louis, September 1904

Anthropological textbooks—for instance, Bob Preucel and Steve Mrozowski’s (2010:9) recent introduction to archaeological theory—state that the four-field approach in anthropology was “first outlined in 1904 by Franz Boas” and that the approach is today under threat from a range of iconoclastic critiques (see Hodder 2005). The standard account of formation and fragmentation has become a “myth of an analytic critiques (see Hodder 2005). The standard account of the “four-field” model of anthropology, which integrated physical anthropology, sociocultural anthropology, linguistic anthropology, and archaeology (Borofsky 2002:468). This “sacred bundle” (Cohn 1980:202) has been at the heart of recent debates about the structure, scope, and coherence of anthropology, both in learned societies like the American Anthropological Association and in the organization of teaching and university anthropology departments (Bruner 2010; Moses 1997; Stocking 1988). The paper traces a strange, transatlantic stratigraphy of charter myths and time warps, through which the four-field model has emerged, running from St. Louis, Missouri, to Oxford, England.

When Boas defined the domain of anthropological knowledge in 1904, it consisted of “the biological history of mankind in all its varieties; linguistics applied to people without written languages; the ethnology of people without historic records; and prehistoric archeology.” This description corresponds to the “four fields” of academic anthropology as it was to develop in the United States, in sharp contrast to continental Europe, and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain. (Stocking 1988:17)

Stocking reprinted Boas’s paper in a volume titled The Shaping of American Anthropology, 1883–1911: A Franz Boas Reader, describing Boas’s importance in 1904 in no uncertain terms: “American anthropology was at this point in a state of incomplete transition. . . . The leading figure of the nineteenth-century social-evolutionary tradition (Louis Henry Morgan, Daniel Garrison Brinton, and John Wesley Powell) were all dead. The leader of the discipline was clearly Boas” (Stocking 1974:21). The paper highlighted by Stocking was read by Boas at the anthropology section of the International Congress of Arts and Science held in St. Louis on September 20, 1904. Delivered in a session chaired by Frederic W. Putnam, its title was “The History of Anthropology.” The full proceedings of the Congress were published in 1906 (Rogers 1906), although Boas also published his paper in Science just a month after the congress, on October 21, 1904.

Unmentioned by Stocking, the proceedings of the St. Louis congress included a much clearer account of a four-field model for anthropology. This was a paper by Alfred Cort Haddon—then lecturer in ethnology at Cambridge University—on the theme of “Ethnology: Its Scope and Problems” (Haddon 1906). In his presidential address to the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland on January 27, 1903, Haddon had presented his vision of the subject of anthropology as organized across four planes. The lowest (biology) and the highest (psychology) of these fell largely outside the subject of anthropology. Sandwiched between these were anthropography (physical anthropology) and, above that, ethnology (including sociology, archaeology, and linguistics)—these last two planes forming the “legitimate bounds of our science” (Haddon 1903:13). But Haddon’s St. Louis lecture made reference not to his own recently published scheme but to a fly sheet circulated by Daniel Garrison Brinton (1837–89) more than a decade previously (Haddon 1906:550).

The fly sheet to which Haddon referred was Brinton’s Proposed Classification and International Nomenclature for the Anthropological Sciences, published in 1892, which set out the four subdivisions of anthropology: (1) somatology (physical and experimental anthropology), (2) ethnology (historic and analytic anthropology), (3) ethnography (geographic and descriptive anthropology), and (4) archaeology (prehistoric and reconstructive anthropology). Brinton held the first professorship in anthropology in the United States: he was appointed professor of ethnology and archaeology at the Academy of Natural Sciences, Philadelphia, and professor of American linguistics and anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania in 1884.3 He published his Classification in three volumes, the first of which was issued in 1897. The sections of the book, entitled “Classification,” “Nomenclature,” and “Bibliography” and consisting of 800 pages, “was met with universal admiration,” according to the New York Times for the month of March 1897, in which it received a full-page review.

3. The North American (“Natural Sciences,” March 6, 1884) described Brinton as “the newly elected professor of ethnology and archaeology.”
simultaneous publications: a paper in American Anthropologist, a diagram published in the proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science at Rochester, and a privately printed pamphlet titled Anthropology as a Science and as a Branch of University Education, setting out the four fields for teaching purposes (Brinton 1892a, 1892b, 1892c). A fourth publication came in 1898, when Haddon reproduced the diagram as the appendix to his book The Study of Man (Haddon 1898:395–397).

Here were the four fields of anthropology clearly set out, although the “linguistics” of Boas’s later account was encompassed within ethnology, which was in turn distinguished as a separate field from ethnography. That the meeting in St. Louis, celebrated for Boas’s indirect listing of four fields of anthropology, has found its way into our twenty-first-century textbooks, rather than Brinton’s four-field classification so energetically circulated by him during 1892 and spelled out by Haddon when he shared a platform with Boas in St. Louis, clearly requires explanation. Reservations about Brinton’s scheme were voiced at the time, by John Wesley Powell in comments at the Anthropological Society of Washington (Powell 1892; see Darnell 1998:91–92) and by Boas’s (1896) paper on “The Limitations of the Comparative Method of Anthropology,” which took issue with Brinton’s account of “the aims of anthropology” (Boas 1896; Brinton 1896). Powell’s comments and Boas’s critique of the comparative method will be explored further below—but not before a time warp that brings us back a decade before Brinton’s fly sheets were produced, and from Missouri to Oxford.

Oxford, May 1882

Conventional accounts of the earliest teaching of anthropology at Oxford are dominated by the figure of Edward Burnett Tylor (1832–1917)—although, as in North America, Franz Boas also features here. Tylor was appointed keeper of the University Museum in March 1883, to a readership in anthropology and training to a new generation of scholars. This culminated in a petition that was brought before the university’s congregation in May 1895 but was narrowly defeated: a decision publicly criticized by Boas in a letter to The Nation.

The development of anthropological teaching at Oxford before 1884 has been little considered (Larson 2008; cf. Riviere 2007; Gosden and Larson 2007). However, the subjects of anthropology and ethnology had been taught at Oxford by George Rolleston (1829–1881) as part of the degree in natural science since 1872. The focus of this teaching had been on physical anthropology as a branch of anatomy, and ethnology as a branch of biology, and Rolleston consolidated and added to a large anatomical collection in the University Museum. The minutes of the Faculty Board of Natural Science record that shortly after Rolleston’s untimely death in June 1881, a draft schedule for the teaching of anthropology was in circulation. By May 1882, a detailed proposal to include the subject as a Final Honour School subject was circulating—just as Tylor later attempted to achieve in 1895. In the event, the subject came onto the statutes only as an optional “Special Subject” in the Final Honour School of Natural Science in 1885, where it remained until 1915. Although the syllabus is on the statutes, whether it was actually taught by Tylor is uncertain.

The earlier history of anthropology at Oxford was bound up with the development of the degree in natural science (begun 1850), with the development of the University Museum (now the University Museum of Natural History, built 1855–1861), and with Oxford’s broader role in the development of Victorian science, especially after the July 1860 debate on evolution during the meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) in Oxford. The central figures here included Henry Acland (Regius Professor of Anatomy, Christ Church) and George Rolleston (Linacre Professor of Anatomy and Physiology, Pembroke College).
College). As early as 1877, a committee appointed by the university’s Hebdomadal Council had recommended “the addition to the University Museum of a Museum of Anthropology,” and Augustus Pitt-Rivers’s close friendship with George Rolleston was an important element of the process that led to the donation of Pitt-Rivers’s ethnographic and archaeological collection—displayed between 1874 and 1882 in London at Bethnal Green and South Kensington—to the university and the founding of the Pitt Rivers Museum in May 1884.

Efforts to establish the teaching of anthropology at Oxford were much more closely bound up with the negotiations that led to the founding of the Pitt Rivers Museum than has previously been acknowledged. As early as 1873, Rolleston had reflected that “Ethnology . . . or ‘Anthropology’ is a subject which, however vast and growing,” had underlined the importance of museum collections to the subject’s development. A letter from E. B. Tylor to General Pitt-Rivers sent in September 1882 made it clear that the museum’s establishment might lead directly to a permanent appointment for Tylor and reflected that “the University establishing your Collection may affect a scheme suggested to me by Rolleston years ago, as to a Readership at Oxford which might help to bring Anthropology into the University course.” As early as March 1881, Henry Nottidge Moseley said of the prospect of Pitt-Rivers’s donation, “I think the collection would be a splendid gain to Oxford and would do much in the way of letting light into the place and would draw well. Besides of course it would act as an introduction to all the other art collections & about to be made and would be of extreme importance to students of anthropology in which subject we hope to allow men to take degrees very shortly.” Rolleston’s death in June 1881 clearly hastened plans both for the donation and for teaching anthropology. Acland, writing in May 1882 about the plans for teaching anthropology, suggested that “in consequence of Rolleston’s death it seems necessary to carry out at once what had long been desired by him.” Later that month, Pitt-Rivers confirmed Rolleston’s interest in anthropology, wishing Acland “every success in your Endeavours to promote Anthropology in Oxford. Professor Rolleston often talked to me about it and we can’t but wish that he had lived to carry it out.”

Plans for the donation of the Pitt-Rivers collection and plans for teaching anthropology coincided in May 1882: the first formal notice of the decree recommending the acceptance of Pitt-Rivers’s collection was published in the University Gazette, and the draft schedule for anthropology teaching was circulated outside Oxford for comment. A detailed response to the schedule was sent by General Pitt-Rivers himself on May 10, 1882, and survives in the Acland Papers (Larson 2008:89). This 1,800-word letter detailed the general’s vision for the instruction of anthropology at Oxford under four headings and was accompanied by a drawing of the discipline of anthropology on a four-field structure, arranged like a kinship diagram (fig. 1).

Written almost exactly a decade before Brinton’s fly sheet was printed, and a generation before Boas read the paper in St. Louis, the Pitt-Rivers drawing and commentary represent the kind of time warp that museums and archives create. Objects, letters, or drawings outlast anthropological thinkers, surviving alongside each other and adding a material dimension to the disciplinary process, nicely expressed by Tim Ingold (1996:59), in which “the possibility always exists to switch track, or for ideas to rebound repeatedly back and forth from one paradigm to another, becoming ever transformed in the process.”

London, May 1882

The vision of a four-field anthropology penned by Pitt-Rivers at his desk in Belgravia and its four-field structure are striking for the time. The Oxford schedule on which Pitt-Rivers was commenting does not survive in the records of the Faculty Board of Natural Science (formed February 1883), but it was clearly not organized into four fields. In fact, it was probably almost identical to that adopted in 1885 when anthropology came to be taught as a special subject in the Final Honours School of Natural Science, dividing the teaching of the subject into seven parts: “I. Comparative anatomy of the various Races of Man; II. Morphology of the various members of the group Anthropomorpha other than Man; III. Modes of physical classification of races; IV. Prehistoric archaeology; V. Rudiments of Comparative Philology; VI. Development of cul-

12. “University Intelligence,” Times, May 22, 1877; this perhaps refers to the transfer of ethnological material from the old Ashmolean Museum rather than the acquisition of a new collection.
13. George Rolleston to Henry George Liddell (vice-chancellor of the University of Oxford), May 7, 1873, typescript letter held by Oxford University Museum of Natural History, John Phillips Archive, misc. printed material, box 102/10, Oxford University printed material.
17. General Pitt-Rivers to Henry Acland, May 21, 1882, Bodleian Library, MS Acland d.92 d92, fols. 75–76.
19. Augustus Pitt-Rivers to William Hatchett-Hackson (Secretary, Board of Natural Science Studies, Oxford), May 10, 1882, Bodleian Library, MS Acland d.92, fols. 79–89. I am grateful to Malgosia Nowak-Kemp for pointing out this document’s existence to me.
Figure 1. "Table of the various sections and sub-sections of Anthropological science according to my view of the matter" by General Augustus Pitt-Rivers: photograph of original manuscript drawing by Pitt-Rivers (A), redrawn by the author (B). Bodleian Library, Acland Papers d92, fol. 90. A color version of this figure is available online.

As with Brinton’s later classification, the first rule of which stated that “no new term should be coined when there exists one in the literature of the science which conveys the meaning” (Brinton 1892b:263), so Pitt-Rivers’s table sought to “employ as far as possible the terms which have come into use for designating the several sections and subjects included under the general head of Anthropology.”

The potential sources of inspiration are disparate. One major influence was the general’s active involvement with British learned societies, especially the BAAS and the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. Anthropology was made a separate section of the BAAS from 2192.

20. Oxford University (1886:94–97); Minutes of the Faculty Board of Natural Science, vol. 1 (1883–92), fols. 73–74, June 22, 1886, University of Oxford Archives FA 4/13/1/1. These statutes remained until 1914 (see Oxford University 1914:184).

21. Augustus Pitt-Rivers to William Hatchett-Hackson (Secretary, Board of Natural Science Studies, Oxford), May 10, 1882, Bodleian Library, MS Acland d.92, fol. 79.
1883: “promoted from the lower rank of a Department of Biology,” as Tylor (1885:899) put it in his presidential address to the BAAS meeting in Montreal, Canada, in September 1884. This process of distinguishing anthropology as a subject separate from biology closely paralleled the intellectual distinctions being debated within the Board of Natural Science at Oxford and built on the inclusive definition of anthropology that had characterized the first edition of Notes and Queries on Anthropology, assembled by a BAAS committee led by Pitt-Rivers, published in 1874 (BAAS 1874). Indeed, as early as 1872, Pitt-Rivers had begun “to classify the papers” on anthropology presented at the BAAS meetings “so as to devote a separate day to each branch of Anthropological science”: “prehistoric archaeology,” “ethnology and philology,” “ethnology—deductive and descriptive,” “psychology,” and “general anthropology” (Lane Fox 1872). As with the BAAS, Pitt-Rivers’s involvement in the Anthropological Institute certainly shaped his vision of anthropology. In his anniversary address to the institute on January 24, 1882, Pitt-Rivers referred to a sevenfold “classification of [anthropological] subjects followed by Mr [John] Evans and myself on former occasions,” comprising “descriptive ethnology,” “deductive ethnology,” “prehistoric archaeology,” “physical anthropology,” “philology,” “sociology,” and “applied anthropology” (Pitt-Rivers 1882:488).

As well as London’s anthropological organizations, the influence of continental definitions of anthropology on Pitt-Rivers’s 1882 classification should not be underestimated. In particular, Pitt-Rivers was familiar with the work of Parisian anthropologists Paul Broca (BAAS 1874) and Paul Topinard, an English translation of whose L’Anthropologie had been recently published and described something close to a four-field definition of anthropology:

“Our subject naturally divides itself into two parts. (1) The study of Man as considered a zoological group. (2) The study of human races as divisions of that group. In the first part we shall consider the three series of characters—the physical, the physiological, and the pathological—upon which natural history depends; and in the second part, more particularly those to be deduced from archaeology, linguistics and ethnography. (Topinard 1878:18)”

But Pitt-Rivers’s knowledge of North American anthropology was certainly also significant here as well. He appears only to have visited North America once, between January and April 1862 while on military service, during which he spent some time in Canada, New York City, and Washington (Evans 2013; Hicks and Petraglia 2013:410), but was certainly aware of American developments through colleagues, professional meetings, and reading. He may, for example, have been aware of the discussions that would lead to a new anthropology section of the American Association for the Advancement of Science—inaugurated at their meeting in Montreal in August 1882, two years before the BAAS launched their section in the same city (Brinton 1892a:4). This was an important time for the formation of North American anthropology, and three organizations of significance for the history of the discipline had been founded in Washington, DC, in 1879: Bureau of Ethnology, the US Geological Survey, and the Anthropological Society of Washington (De Laguna 1960:103). Pitt-River’s personal library catalog records that he owned copies of material produced by all three organizations.22 This included John Wesley Powell’s First Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnography, published in 1881, which demonstrated a breadth of anthropological research similar to that set out in his letter. But among his broad collection of American anthropological publications of the 1870s and early 1880s, Pitt-Rivers’s possession of a set of early Transactions of the Anthropological Society of Washington is perhaps even more telling. The original constitution of the society, drafted in 1879 by a committee comprising J. M. Toner, Otis T. Mason, Garrick Mallory, and Wills DeHass, stated that its object was “to encourage the study of the Natural History of Man, especially with reference to America,” dividing the “active operations” of the society into four sections: “Section A, Archaeology; Section B, Somatology; Section C, Ethnology; Section D, Philology” (Anthropological Society of Washington 1882:6–7). The Washington scheme brings us back from General Pitt-Rivers’ desk in London in May 1882, and from Oxford’s discussions about collections and teaching, back across the Atlantic, 13 years before Brinton’s fly sheet, to the first meetings of the society at the Smithsonian Institution in February 1879, and to what is perhaps the earliest iteration of the four-field model for anthropology.

Washington, DC, February 1879 and April 1892

When Daniel Brinton (1892b:268) drew a four-field classification of anthropology on a blackboard at the Anthropological Society of Washington on April 5, 1892, he was presenting back to the society their own idea of 13 years earlier. The rhetoric was powerful: during these 13 years, anthropological subfields were proliferating from somatology to psychology, esthetology, technology, arts, sociology, institutions, philology, sophiology (including cult-lore and folk-lore), economics, civics, ethics, natural religion, and even literature (Lamb 1906:565; Powell 1892). Indeed, many of these new terms were chalked on the Smithsonian blackboard by John Wesley Powell (1892:268) himself during the major’s response to Brinton’s talk.

Brinton’s active promotion of the four-field model in 1892 was undoubtedly the most influential moment in the establishment of the “sacred bundle” in North American anthropology. In his 1895 presidential address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Springfield, Massachusetts, Brinton even noted that his study of “the or-

22. Catalog of the Library at Farnham, University of Cambridge Archives, Catalogs of the Collections of Augustus Henry Lane Fox Pitt-Rivers, MS Add.9455.10.
igions of sacred numbers” had “shown the prepotency of the number four both in American and New World mythology, ritual, statecraft, and so on” (1896:11 n. 1). But the key to understanding both Brinton’s four-field model and that drawn up by Pitt-Rivers lies not in Brinton’s ideas about sacred numbers but in rethinking the history of the classification of anthropological knowledge.

It is clear that in the late 1870s and early 1880s, anthropologists in London, Oxford, and Washington, DC, were communicating with sufficient regularity for the various intellectual influences, from learned societies to continental anthropology, to be shared in the organization of anthropology. But more than this, what the group of anthropologists assembled at the Smithsonian in February 1879 had in common with Pitt-Rivers and those with whom he was corresponding at Oxford, and with Brinton at the Academy of Natural Sciences, was a concern with the development and arrangement of anthropological knowledge in the form of museum collections. If the four-field classification for anthropological fields was so closely bound up with the very idea of classificatory anthropology, then we must look carefully again at Boas’s statement on four-field anthropology and his rejection of classificatory anthropology.

Discussion: Museums and Classification

Like Brinton in Philadelphia and Frederic Putnam at Harvard, Boas had been appointed to a combination of museum and university posts, as curator at the American Museum of Natural History (from 1896) and teaching at Columbia University (from 1897; Darnell 1998:104; Voegelin 1950:350). These earliest university appointments in anthropology, linking museums with teaching, were in keeping with Brinton’s vision of the teaching of anthropology that defined a laboratory and a museum—“arranged both ethnologically, that is in series showing their evolution, and ethnographically, that is, illustrating the geographical provinces and ethnic areas from which they are derived”—as requirements: “Anthropology is not a theoretical subject. It is essentially experimental and practical, a science of observation and operative procedures. It cannot be learned by merely reading books and attending lectures. The student must literally put his hand to the work” (Brinton 1892:7). But Boas’s (1904) paper was written in a very different context and shortly before his resignation the following year from the American Museum of Natural History to focus on teaching at Columbia. In this light, rereading the full context in which his list of four fields appeared is revealing:

The historical development of the work of anthropologists seems to single out clearly a domain of knowledge that heretofore has not been treated by any other science. It is the biological history of mankind in all its varieties; linguistics applied to people without written languages; the ethnology of people without historic records; and prehistoric archaeology. It is true that these limits are constantly being over-stepped, but the unbiased observer will recognize that in all other fields special knowledge is required which cannot be supplied by general anthropology. The general problem of the evolution of mankind is being taken up now by the investigator of primitive tribes, now by the student of the history of civilization. We may still recognize in it the ultimate aim of anthropology in the wider sense of the term, but we must understand at it will be reached by co-operation between all the mental sciences and the efforts of the anthropologist. The field of research that has been left for anthropology in the narrower sense of the term is, even as it is, almost too wide, and there are indications of its breaking up. (523)

Boas’s future-oriented, programmatic paper, using the history of anthropology to shore up the disciplinary present, showed the hallmarks of the modernist anthropologies described by Ardener above. But although imagined today as a founding document for four-field anthropology, Boas’s “The History of Anthropology” was clearly a statement not of unity, but of emergent fragmentation in the emergent discipline, developing from a tripartite range of differing scientific methods—“biological, linguistic and ethnologic-archaeological” (Boas 1904:523).

The fragmentation presented in “The History of Anthropology” was precisely that with which Brinton had been concerned when he evoked the 1870s four-field classification 12 years earlier. Powell (1892) and Boas (1904) understood this diversification as a crucial part of the new field-oriented, academic anthropology. Thus, the “breaking up” was not only of the four-field model but also of what William Sturtevant once called anthropology’s “museum period” (1969:622). As methodological diversity and regional specialization paved the way for the modern discipline, replacing evolutionary and classificatory with culture-historical and functionalist approaches, concerns with the problem of classifying anthropological knowledge in the form of material collections faded.

Undoubtedly, as in other contexts (Castañeda 2003:258), George Stocking overemphasized the influence of Boas at the expense of intellectual exchanges beyond the borders of the United States: celebrating him as “the anthropologist with whom I identify most closely” (Stocking 1992:115). But by 1904, anthropology was changing unrecognizably. The International Congress of Arts and Science at which Boas was speaking was, along with the first Olympic Games to be held in the United States, part of the Louisiana Purchase Centennial Exposition. Today, the 1904 exposition is infamous as one of “the most extensive, but also the last, major public celebration by anthropologists of nineteenth-century unilinear, cultural evolution and anthropometry,” against which “cultural anthropology moved in a new direction” largely through the agency of Boas (Parezo and Fowler 2007:399; Gilbert 2009:55–61; cf. Stocking 1960a). The nineteenth-century exhibitionary culture of classificatory and evolutionary anthropology had degenerated into the “Anthropology Days.”
organized by W. J. McGee of the St. Louis Public Museum at the exposition, which sought to “combine the agenda of anthropology and physical culture” by conducting “entertainment as pseudo-experiments to demonstrate the natural athletic ability of the different races” (Parezo and Fowler 2007: 347–348; cf. McGee 1906).

For both Stocking and Boas, St. Louis in 1904 represented a watershed for Americanist anthropology; across the Atlantic, the founding of Oxford’s Diploma in Anthropology in 1906 saw museum anthropology give way to new sociocultural approaches, stretching from Tylor to Radcliffe-Brown. Boas reflected on the classification of anthropological knowledge in “The History of Anthropology” and looked ahead to its fragmentation in a manner that came to be built into the four-field model. The four-field classification of anthropology clearly began a generation before Boas’s paper, with attempts in the 1870s to arrange and classify anthropological knowledge, in the form of material culture, on both sides of the Atlantic. And today, the problem of organizing anthropological knowledge in the form of material culture lies at the heart of the question of how to use museum collections to write the history of the discipline.

Conclusion

This paper has considered how the Pitt-Rivers drawing and letter might contribute to our understanding of the development of the four-field model of anthropology. In answering, it has been necessary to address a parallel question: that of the extent to which collections-based research into anthropology’s past requires us to develop distinctive forms of disciplinary historiography. The connection between the two questions is the issue of the role of museums and material culture in anthropology, past and present.

We have seen how the ethnographer’s instinct to use native categories can reveal intellectual histories as ready-mades that are built into so much twentieth-century anthropological writing. Like Malinowski’s description of the mythology of the *kula*, the uncertain temporal depth of the four-field mythology has, since Boas’s 1904 “The History of Anthropology” paper, served as “a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom” (Malinowski 1926:23). But “mythological worlds,” as Boas himself put it, can be “built up only to be shattered again,” and “new worlds . . . built from their fragments” (Boas 1898:18). The time warps created by curatorial time-stopping transform anthropological museums into archaeological sites filled with the remnants of knowledge production. In museums, Kuhnian “disciplinary matrices” become stratified like archaeological matrices of site formation (Kuhn 1970:182). A principal challenge is therefore to use museum objects and documents for something more than the illustration of progressive histories of ideas that are always already written (by twentieth-century anthropology itself).

Our answer to the question of the significance of the drawing and letter is therefore not to rewrite disciplinary origins to begin with Daniel Brinton in April 1892, with Augustus Pitt-Rivers in May 1882, with Otis T. Mason and his colleagues in February 1879, or with any other single moment of intellectual origin. Clearly, in the 1870s and 1880s, the four-field classifications of anthropology were concerned with museum collections, with the problem of classifying anthropological knowledge in material form: the archaeological, ethnological, ethnographic/sociological, and physical anthropological objects in museum collections, from Washington, DC, to Oxford. If classificatory anthropology was involved with the classification of anthropology into fields—whether fourfold, twofold, sevenfold, or any shape of classification—then Boas’s four-field model came hand in hand with the critique of classificatory approaches from historical ones. As the discipline turned from museums and things to fieldwork and field notes, and from object lessons to human subjects (Hicks 2010), St. Louis was part of the beginning of that “breaking up”: not the beginning of the four fields. The four-field idea was just one element of the classification of anthropological knowledge in nineteenth-century museums.

Finding answers to the second question—that of historiography—is more challenging. In the twentieth century, the idea of museums as sites for the creation of anthropological knowledge faded. But the problem of organizing anthropological ideas in material form, with which nineteenth-century anthropology was grappling, has not gone away. With the clocks stopped, museums juxtapose anthropological ideas as fragments of time in material form. Museum galleries and storerooms bring encounters with disciplinary pasts that are archaeological in character: a double historicity of contemporary knowledge and disciplinary ancestry. A principal challenge is to think through anthropological museums as field sites filled with the material remains of our discipline’s history: places for rethinking charter myths, revealing time warps, and perhaps strengthening our four-field thinking in the process—places, in other words, for new kinds of historical archaeology.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Malgosia Nowak-Kemp for introducing me to the Pitt-Rivers letter and drawing and to Jeremy Coote and Alison Petch for pointing me to Fran Larson’s discussion of it. I am grateful to Mary Beaudry, Richard Bradley, Chris Gosden, Andy Jones, Adam Kuper, Danny Miller, Stephanie Moser, Mike O’Hanlon, Peter Pels, and Nathan Schlanger for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The paper would have been impossible without more than a decade of research projects exploring the history of anthropology at Oxford undertaken from the Pitt Rivers Museum, in which Jeremy Coote, Chris Gosden, Chris Morton, Fran Larson, and Alison Petch have played pioneering roles. Much of this work can be explored through the museum’s website: http://www.prm.ox.ac.uk/.


